Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2019

The President and Nuclear Weapons: Authorities, Limits, and
Process
Mary B. DeRosa
Georgetown University Law Center, mbd58@georgetown.edu

Ashley Nicolas
Georgetown University Law Center, acn47@georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2219
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3595440

Nuclear Threat Initiative Paper, Dec. 2019.
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the President/Executive
Department Commons

NTI Paper
DECEMBER 2019

The President and Nuclear
Weapons: Authorities, Limits,
and Process
SUMMARY
There is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a
nuclear strike. In the Cold War, the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation
necessitated procedures emphasizing speed and efficiency and placing sole
decision-making authority in the president’s hands. In today’s changed
threat environment, the legal authorities and process a U.S. president would
confront when making this grave decision merit reexamination. This paper
serves as a resource in the national discussion about a president’s legal
authority and the procedures for ordering a nuclear strike, and whether to
update them.
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The President and Nuclear Weapons: Authorities, Limits, and Process

Executive Summary

T

here is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a nuclear strike. The U.S.
government grappled with the process for making that decision during the decades of the Cold War.
The threat of sudden nuclear annihilation by the Soviet Union shaped the resulting procedures, which
emphasize speed and efficiency and which place sole decision-making authority in the president’s hands.
Today we face a different threat environment, but tensions remain between states with nuclear weapons.
As a result, public and congressional attention has focused on the legal authorities and limitations, as well
as the process, that a U.S. president would confront when making the grave decision of whether to use a
nuclear weapon. It is a complex subject, and few sources address it clearly and
simply. This paper seeks to fill that gap by identifying the key legal questions
relevant to a president’s decision and by summarizing the state of the law and the
relevant process.
There is no more

consequential
Currently, neither domestic nor international law specifically addresses the
authority to use nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, because of the devastating
decision for a
potential of those weapons, existing authorities relating to use of force generally
president than
may apply differently to nuclear weapons than to other weapons. The paper looks
first at U.S. domestic law, including the Constitution and statutes, and examines
ordering a nuclear
the respective powers of the president and Congress in decisions about the use
strike.
of nuclear weapons. The Constitution’s division of war powers between the
executive and legislative branches is notoriously murky. Congressional authority
might act in two ways to restrict a president’s decision to use nuclear weapons:
(1) if the president is required to seek congressional authorization before use, and
(2) if a statute prohibits or limits certain uses of those weapons. Regarding the first, there is little question
that a president has the authority to respond in self-defense against a nuclear attack without seeking prior
authorization. The more difficult question arises when a president plans a first use of nuclear weapons. There
is a strong argument that if a president contemplates a first use of nuclear weapons to preempt a perceived
nuclear threat before the threat has developed to the point at which an attack has begun or is imminent, he
must first seek authorization from Congress. The legal conclusion might be different, however, if the first
use is in response to a conventional attack on the United States or in the course of a conventional armed
conflict.
Like questions about authorization, the extent of Congress’s power to limit by statute a president’s authority
to use nuclear weapons is controversial. Congress clearly has some power to affect a president’s decisionmaking in this area, if it chooses to act. Most experts agree that Congress’s various war powers would allow
it to prevent entirely the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Congress could also deny funding for
weapons through its appropriations power. Congress’s broad authorities to establish and regulate armies
and a navy also include some power to restrict presidential decision-making about when and how to use
nuclear weapons, but how much is not clear. The closer congressional action comes to micromanaging
tactical “battlefield” decisions, the more likely it is to run afoul of the president’s authority as commander
in chief.
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The paper next examines international law and how it may act to limit a president’s options in using
nuclear force. The United Nations (UN) Charter would prohibit any use of force, including nuclear force,
in the territory of another state unless the state consents, the UN Security Council authorizes the force,
or the force is in self-defense against an actual or imminent armed attack. In addition, for a use of nuclear
force to be legal, it must satisfy customary ad bellum international law requirements of necessity and
proportionality. The proportionality principle is likely to be a challenge for any first use of nuclear weapons
in self-defense because of the enormous destructive power of those weapons. International humanitarian
law (IHL) regulates the means and methods used in conflict and balances the two fundamental principles
of humanity and military necessity. The principle of humanity includes three
key requirements: distinction, proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary
suffering. Each of these requirements presents a very significant legal hurdle for
the use of nuclear weapons.
Before any actual

decision to launch,
the president has
an opportunity
to consult with
advisers, including
his lawyers,
although there is no
requirement that
he do so. The final
decision to launch
is the president’s
alone.

Last, the paper examines—to the extent possible in an unclassified source—
the current executive branch process for decisions about nuclear launch, the
opportunities those procedures afford for a president to receive legal advice,
and possible protections against an illegal nuclear strike order. The policies and
procedures by which the United States may employ nuclear weapons are designed
to ensure that, if deterrence fails, the United States has the capability to respond
effectively with nuclear weapons. The process for nuclear launch decisions
includes extensive contingency planning in peacetime that provides a president
with a range of options that have been debated and reviewed in advance, including
by lawyers. Before any actual decision to launch, the president has an opportunity
to consult with advisers, including his lawyers, although there is no requirement
that he do so. The final decision to launch is the president’s alone. Once a president
makes this decision, the order goes to an Emergency Action Team at the Pentagon
and a structured and automatic process begins, with limited flexibility for the
actors in that process to raise legal concerns.

Because a president’s order to launch nuclear weapons could violate U.S.
or international law, an important question is whether there are sufficient
opportunities to guard against an illegal order. The process provides some
opportunities, but there are no guarantees. As noted, there is legal review of the
predeveloped or preplanned options presented to the president for decision. This review focuses on IHL
issues and can eliminate options that are illegal under any circumstance, but it does not address fully the
constitutional, ad bellum, or other legal issues that rely on an understanding of the specific context and
circumstances of a potential strike. A president may seek additional legal advice before a decision to launch;
this would often happen as part of the traditional National Security Council process. A president may
choose to truncate that process, however, or even dispense with it altogether.
With respect to the question of whether and how an illegal order to launch nuclear weapons could be
impeded, there are two possible mechanisms. One is the obligation for members of the armed forces to
refuse unlawful orders, and the other is the process set out in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution for transfer of power in the event of a president’s disability. Both are difficult and of limited
use in this context. After the president makes a launch decision, a member of the Emergency Action Team
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responsible for implementation may raise concerns that the order is unlawful. Members of the armed forces
are obligated to refuse orders that are “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. This is a strict standard, however,
and the legal issues involved are complex and fact dependent. The automatic nature of the post-decision
process for implementing a launch order could make it difficult for military personnel to seek and receive
adequate advice in the time available.
The second mechanism—the Twenty-Fifth Amendment procedures—involves several steps, including the
vice president seeking a vote of principal Cabinet members, notification to Congress, an opportunity for
the president to reverse the transfer, a second cabinet vote and congressional notification, and a vote of
both houses of Congress. The process is time consuming, but it does, in principle, provide a possible route
to transfer of power in the extreme case in which an infirm president is determined to move forward with
what the president’s cabinet judges to be a reckless or illegal nuclear strike.
This paper illuminates but does not attempt to provide authoritative answers to the many complex and
contested legal issues that accompany decisions about the use of nuclear force. It identifies some limitations
on a president’s actions and potential shortcomings in the existing process. Its primary purpose, however, is
to highlight key issues, summarize the various viewpoints, and provide some practical insight into how legal
questions may arise and whether and how they can affect decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons.
This paper is intended to serve as a resource in the national discussion pertaining to the authority and
procedures of a president to order a nuclear launch, and potential options for updating that authority and
those procedures.
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Introduction

T

here is no more consequential decision for a president than ordering a nuclear strike. The U.S.
government grappled with the process for making that decision during the decades of the Cold War.
The threat of sudden nuclear annihilation by the Soviet Union shaped the resulting procedures, which
emphasize speed and efficiency and which place sole decision-making authority in the president’s hands.
Today we face a different threat environment, but tensions remain between states with nuclear weapons.
As a result, public and congressional attention has focused on the legal authorities and limitations, as well
as the process, that a U.S. president would confront when making the grave decision of whether to use a
nuclear weapon. It is a complex subject, and few sources address it clearly and simply.

The U.S.
Constitution’s
division of war
powers between
the executive and
legislative branches
is notoriously
murky. Few areas
of law are more
debated and less
settled.

This paper seeks to fill that gap by identifying the key legal questions and
summarizing the state of the law. It first discusses U.S. law—the Constitution and
statutes—and examines the respective powers of the president and Congress in
decisions about the use of nuclear weapons. The paper next looks at international
law and how it may act to limit a president’s options for using nuclear force. Finally,
it examines the current executive branch process for decisions about nuclear
launch, the opportunities those procedures afford for providing legal advice, and
possible protections against an illegal nuclear strike order.
The paper does not attempt to provide authoritative answers to the many complex
and contested legal issues that accompany decisions about nuclear force. It does
identify some limitations on a president’s actions and potential shortcomings in
the existing process. Its primary purpose, however, is to highlight key issues, to
summarize the various viewpoints, and to provide some practical insight into
how legal questions may arise and whether and how they can affect decisions.

Does U.S. Law Limit the President’s Decision to Use
Nuclear Weapons?

The U.S. Constitution’s division of war powers between the executive
and legislative branches is notoriously murky. Few areas of law are
more debated and less settled. The Constitution confers significant authority on each branch, but
the exact scope of those authorities and the ways in which they interact remain controversial.
Congressional authority might act in two principal ways to restrict a president’s decision to use
nuclear weapons: (1) if the president is required to seek congressional authorization before use, and
(2) if a statute prohibits or limits certain uses of those weapons.
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Constitutional War Powers: Background
As part of an attempt to create structural checks on the power of each coequal branch of government, the
Founders granted war power authority to both the executive and legislative branches. The Constitution’s
grants of authority to Congress to “declare War,”1 to “raise and support Armies,”2 to “provide and maintain
a Navy,” 3 and to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”4 among
others—as well as Congress’s power over appropriations,5 including for the national defense and foreign
affairs—collectively provide significant power over the military and foreign affairs.6
There is wide—although not universal—agreement among constitutional scholars and practitioners that
the power to “declare War” was intended to (and still does) require congressional authorization for some
conflicts.7 Those experts just disagree about the kinds of conflicts8 and the degree of control this authority
gives Congress over the conduct of those conflicts.9 Contemporary understandings of the “declare War”
clause generally deem an authorization for the use of military force or other
statutory authorization to be an acceptable mechanism for Congress to exercise
its authority and do not require a formal declaration of war.10 The powers to
“raise and support Armies,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
As part of an
the land and naval Forces,” and “provide and maintain a Navy,” some scholars
attempt to create
argue, necessarily include the lesser authority to regulate or restrict the weapons
structural checks on
those military services may use.11 Finally, the appropriations power can be used
to impose meaningful limitations on the conduct of military action. The most
the power of each
significant use of the “power of the purse” to limit the military was the 1973
coequal branch of
prohibition of use of appropriations to support combat activities in Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos.12 Congress could also use its appropriations power to slow
government, the
or halt the development of new nuclear capabilities, to limit nuclear explosive
Founders granted
testing, to limit the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenal, or to reduce the
war power authority
size of the nuclear force.13
The president’s principal war power derives from Article II’s instruction that the
“President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States.”14 As commander in chief, the president has
“command of the forces and the conduct of military campaigns.”15 This is widely
understood to confer on the president alone the authority to command forces and
direct the conduct of military campaigns through “battlefield decisions.”16

to both the executive
and legislative
branches.

Scholars—and, to a lesser degree, courts—have grappled throughout U.S. history with how these grants of
authority interact. There is general agreement that the president’s war powers have expanded, in practice,
since World War II.17 There are many explanations for this expansion.18 Even so, the degree of this shift is
not clear, and most would agree that Congress maintains significant authority.
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Is Congressional Authorization Required for Use of Nuclear Weapons?
All but those with the most executive-favoring view of war powers19 would agree that some circumstances
exist under which Congress’s war powers require the president to obtain congressional authorization before
taking military action. The question, then, is: when does a president’s plan to use a nuclear weapon trigger
this requirement?

A nuclear attack on
the United States
represents one of
the gravest threats
imaginable. The
president would
need to act quickly
and decisively. There
is little doubt of his
authority under
those circumstances
to respond with
nuclear force
without seeking
prior authorization
from Congress.

There are two relevant scenarios to consider: (1) a scenario in which a president
plans to use a nuclear weapon in self-defense against a nuclear attack, and (2) a
U.S. “first use” of nuclear weapons.20 The latter scenario is the more complicated,
and there is a strong argument that the president would be required to seek
congressional authorization in some first-use scenarios.

Self-Defense against Nuclear Attack
The president has the authority, on his own initiative, to use force in self-defense
to repel an attack on the United States. This was the Supreme Court’s holding
in the Prize Cases.21 In that Civil War–era opinion, the court held that no prior
declaration of war was required before President Lincoln blockaded Southern
ports in response to a Confederate use of force. The court concluded that “the
President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special
legislative authority.”22 This presidential authority to act unilaterally in the face of
an attack is widely accepted.23 A nuclear attack on the United States represents
one of the gravest threats imaginable. The president would need to act quickly
and decisively. There is little doubt of his authority under those circumstances to
respond with nuclear force without seeking prior authorization from Congress.

First Use of Nuclear Weapons

A more difficult question arises when a president plans a first use of nuclear
weapons.24 First-use scenarios fall into two broad categories, although there
are variations within each category: (1) a first use of nuclear weapons intended,
perhaps, to address a perceived nuclear threat but launched before that threat
has developed to the point at which a nuclear attack has begun or is imminent,
and (2) a first use in response to a conventional attack or during a conventional armed conflict. In the first
scenario, the argument that prior congressional authorization would be required is stronger.
First Use in the Absence of Conflict or Attack. There is a long history of presidents using conventional
force without congressional authorization and not in response to an attack on the United States. Most
notably, President Harry S. Truman never sought or received authorization for U.S. involvement in the
Korean War, a conflict that lasted longer than three years.25 Executive branch precedent since that time,
however, generally supports the view that Truman’s actions were not constitutional and that congressional
approval was required.26
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More common have been presidential commitments of troops or uses of force in more limited circumstances
without congressional sanction.27 Two recent examples of this type of deployment are (1) the Obama
administration’s participation in a 2011 allied military air operation in Libya in reaction to fears of an
impending massacre by the al-Gaddafi regime28 and (2) the Trump administration’s strikes in Syria in
response to the Assad government’s use of chemical weapons on its own citizens.29 In both circumstances,
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of Justice—the office that provides definitive legal
advice for the executive branch—advised the president that congressional authorization was not required
before using force.30
OLC engages in two inquiries in determining whether using force without congressional authorization, and
in the absence of an attack, is appropriate: (1) whether the president can find that the proposed operations
further “important national interests,” and (2) whether the “anticipated nature, scope, and duration” of the
anticipated conflict “constitutes a ‘war’ within the meaning of the Declaration of War clause.”31 Presumably,
any president contemplating the use of a nuclear weapon will be able to articulate a satisfactory national
interest in doing so. It will be a greater hurdle, however, to demonstrate that the
planned engagement does not constitute a “war” in the constitutional sense.
In its Libya and Syria opinions, OLC emphasizes the “limited means, objectives,
and intended duration”32 of the planned operations and the “efforts to avoid
escalation”33 to illustrate that the conflict falls short of “war.” OLC identifies the type
of engagement that would trigger a requirement for congressional authorization
as one involving “prolonged and substantial” military actions that typically would
involve “exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial
period.”34 Among the considerations deemed relevant is whether U.S. forces are
“likely to ‘suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.’”35

A more difficult
question arises when
a president plans a
first use of nuclear
weapons.

Any analysis of these issues is highly fact dependent, but it is unlikely that a
proposed first-use nuclear strike would be “limited” in “means, objectives, and
intended duration.” Casualties would likely be massive and the risk of escalation great.36 In applying the
executive branch’s own legal analysis, then, a proposed first use of nuclear weapons when the United States
has neither been attacked nor is engaged in an authorized conflict would likely be considered a “war” for
purposes of the “declare War” clause and would require prior authorization.
First Use Following a Conventional Strike or During Conventional Armed Conflict. The legal question
could change if a first use of nuclear weapons is in response to a conventional attack on the United States
or during an ongoing conventional armed conflict. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has held
that the president is not required to seek authorization when responding in self-defense.37 The president’s
powers may also be greater when the country is engaged in armed conflict, particularly if it is an authorized
conflict. Some have suggested that a nuclear response to a conventional provocation or conflict is so
sharply escalatory that it “arguably initiates a new and dangerously more threatening war” and therefore
requires congressional approval even if the president is acting in self-defense or the country is engaged in an
authorized armed conflict, which the president seeks to escalate.38 Throughout much of the Cold War, U.S.
policy held that the response to a large-scale Soviet conventional attack would be nuclear use.39 Although
the policy was silent on whether Congress would authorize that response, this does suggest that the U.S.
Government at that time did not share the view that a nuclear response would initiate a new conflict. Given
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that precedent, the president’s lawyers would probably conclude that he has the authority to respond with
nuclear force on his own initiative, particularly if a rapid response is needed.

Practical Challenges: Enforcement and Accountability
As discussed, there are at least some scenarios in which a president should obtain congressional approval
before engaging in a first use of nuclear weapons. It is not clear, however, how much this legal requirement
would, as a practical matter, limit presidential action because there is no
mechanism to enforce it. There is little chance that the courts would act on the
issue, because they are notoriously reluctant to involve themselves in war powers
disputes.40 Increasingly, Congress is also reluctant to assert itself on matters of war
There are at least
and peace.41

some scenarios in
which a president
should obtain
congressional
approval before
engaging in a first
use of nuclear
weapons. It is not
clear, however, how
much this legal
requirement would,
as a practical matter,
limit presidential
action because there
is no mechanism to
enforce it.

There are many strong legal, political, and governance arguments for obtaining
congressional authorization before using a nuclear weapon. But for a president
unmoved by those arguments, the improbability of court or congressional
intervention removes a powerful motivation to obtain authorization. Unless
public pressure provides a different incentive, the Constitution’s requirement of
prior authorization may have little practical effect.

May Congress Limit or Prohibit Use of Nuclear Weapons?
Currently, no statute limits or regulates the president’s authority to use nuclear
weapons. Bills on the subject have been introduced and debated over the decades,
however,42 and congressional interest has increased recently.43 Like questions
about authorization, the extent of Congress’s authority to pass such a statute is
controversial, although Congress certainly has some power to affect the president’s
decision-making in this area if it chooses to act.

Since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court and lower courts, when
considering the interplay of executive and legislative powers, have looked to
Justice Robert H. Jackson’s analysis in the 1952 case Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer.44 In that case, which considered President Truman’s seizure of
steel production facilities during the Korean War, Justice Jackson explained that
the president’s powers generally “are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”45 Thus, the president’s
flexibility to act in areas such as this one, in which both branches possess authority,
depends in part on whether Congress has spoken on the issue. When the president
acts in a way that is consistent with an express or implied authorization by Congress, “his authority is at its
maximum.”46 When Congress has been silent on an issue, the president may rely only on his own powers,
but there is a “zone of twilight”47 in which the distribution of powers is uncertain and congressional inertia
can enable presidential action. When the president acts in a way that is incompatible with the express or
implied will of Congress, “his power is at its lowest ebb” and he can act only when his power is “exclusive”
and “so conclusive and preclusive” that it is “beyond control by Congress.”48
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As discussed, the precise limits of congressional and executive war powers authority are a source of
continual debate.49 Some things are fairly clear. Congress’s power to “raise and support Armies,” “provide
and maintain a Navy,” and “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”
would allow Congress to remove nuclear weapons from the U.S. arsenal. Congress could also deny funding
for the weapons.50 The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress has some authority to constrain
the president’s activities during wartime,51 although the degree of that authority remains unclear. Most
experts would agree that if Congress attempted to legislate specific tactical moves in battle or to issue orders
directly to the president’s subordinates, that would intrude impermissibly on
“exclusive” presidential authority.52 How far this goes is less clear. Some argue
that a choice of which weapon to employ—once that weapon is in the arsenal—is,
similarly, an exclusive presidential authority on which Congress cannot intrude.53
The Supreme Court
Others say that Congress’s powers to establish and regulate armies and a navy,
has long recognized
as well as to cut off funds for nuclear weapons entirely, necessarily include the
authority to place restrictions on the president’s decision-making with respect to
that Congress has
54
the use of those weapons.
Assuming that Congress possesses some authority to limit the president’s
ability to use nuclear weapons, the next question is what types of restrictions
are most likely to survive scrutiny—either by the courts (although court review
is quite unlikely),55 or by the executive branch.56 The closer a statute comes to
micromanaging tactical “battlefield” decisions, the more problematic it becomes.
Some possible actions include the following.

some authority
to constrain the
president’s activities
during wartime,
although the degree
of that authority
remains unclear.

Limitation by Statute of First Use of Nuclear Weapons. Legislation proposed in
the 115th Congress would restrict the president’s ability, on his own, to order a
“first-use nuclear strike,” defined as an “attack using nuclear weapons against an
enemy that is conducted without the president determining that the enemy has
first launched a nuclear strike against” the United States or its allies.57 The proposal
does not prohibit first use or declare a policy against it, but it asserts Congress’s role in the decision-making
process by stating that such a strike would violate the Constitution unless Congress had first passed a
declaration of war that “expressly authorizes” a nuclear strike.58 Congress has considered similar legislation
in the past.59

There is a strong argument, articulated in the previous section, that such a proposal is within Congress’s power.
Unlike a prohibition, it would not take a military option off the table. Instead, it asserts a congressional role
in this highly consequential national security decision. Nonetheless, this claim of congressional authority
could be controversial within the executive branch, making it likely that the legislation would prompt a
veto.
Limitations as Part of a Force Authorization. A similar but more targeted option would be for Congress—
in the process of authorizing a conventional conflict—to limit the use of nuclear weapons in that conflict.
For example, Congress might clarify that first use of nuclear weapons would require separate authorization.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may limit the scope and targets of a conflict it has authorized.60
On many occasions throughout U.S. history, Congress has authorized the use of force but placed limitations
on how that force may be employed,61 including by identifying permissible targets,62 by specifying which
military service could be used,63 and by limiting the geographic or temporal scope of the conflict.64 There
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does not appear to be an example of Congress restricting the type of weapon that the president may use,
but an argument can be made that such a restriction does not differ in relevant ways from those precedents.
Such an approach might be less likely to invite a veto than a statute limiting the first use of nuclear weapons
because the president would presumably want the underlying authorization. The approach would not be
without its detractors, however. Some would argue, for example, that it undermines deterrence to take
nuclear weapons off the table. In addition, limitations on authorization in the
context of an ongoing conflict could prove politically difficult for members of
Congress.

International laws
related to conflict—
including the UN
Charter, the Geneva
Conventions,
and other treaty
and customary
international laws—
operate differently
from domestic
law found in the
U.S. Constitution
and statutes. They
can nonetheless
act to constrain a
president’s decisionmaking related to
the use of nuclear
weapons.

Imposing Procedural Requirements for a First-Use Decision. A more limited
but perhaps more realistic recent proposal would not seek to insert Congress into
the president’s decision-making process for the first use of nuclear weapons but
would strengthen that process within the executive branch.65 Such a proposal
reflects the concern, discussed in Section III, that there are inadequate mechanisms
to ensure that the president receives responsible advice and considers all relevant
factors in a decision about first use of nuclear weapons.66 Possible procedural
protections could include a requirement that the secretary of defense certify that
the launch order is valid—that is, that it comes from the commander in chief—
and that the attorney general (or designee) be included in the decision process
and confirm that the order is legal.67
Although those requirements, if imposed by Congress,68 would no doubt generate
some constitutional concerns, they are far less intrusive on presidential authorities
than the other alternatives discussed. Those who seek congressional input on
these decisions will not find this approach as satisfying as the options previously
discussed, but it is less likely to prompt a veto or other negative executive branch
action and thus stands a better chance of becoming law.69

Does International Law Limit the President’s
Authority to Use Nuclear Weapons?
International laws related to conflict—including the UN Charter, the Geneva
Conventions, and other treaty and customary international laws—operate
differently from domestic law found in the U.S. Constitution and statutes. They
can nonetheless act to constrain a president’s decision-making related to the use
of nuclear weapons.70

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in a 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons,
concluded that “[t]here is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and
universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.”71 The court emphasized, however, that
any use of force by means of nuclear weapons must comply with the UN Charter and its provisions related
to the use of force as well as with the principles of international humanitarian law and other international
laws related to conflict.72 As discussed in more detail in Section II.b, the court concluded that “the threat
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary” to international law related to conflict, particularly
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IHL, but it could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful
or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake.”73

Some Uses of Nuclear Weapons Could Violate the UN Charter and Jus Ad Bellum
Principles of International Law
Although the use of nuclear weapons is not per se prohibited under international
law, there are a variety of ways in which a nuclear strike—particularly a first use
of nuclear weapons—could violate specific international law requirements. For
example, using force with a nuclear weapon—or any other weapon—could violate
the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force in the territory of another state
unless it met the requirements for one of the exceptions to that prohibition.74 One
exception, found in Article 51 of the charter, permits a use of force in self-defense
against an armed attack.75 Thus, a military strike, using a nuclear weapon or any
other weapon, would be illegal if the United States had not suffered an armed
attack.76 A state need not wait until an armed attack has occurred to respond in selfdefense, but can act in anticipatory self-defense if an armed attack is “imminent.”77
What qualifies as an imminent attack is the subject of some disagreement among
nations and legal experts. A preventive strike—that is, one against a prospective
attacker that has the capability to strike but is neither planning nor preparing to do
so—would not be a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense.78 It is the position
of the U.S. government that the imminence standard is not solely a question of
temporal proximity, but can be based on other circumstances. For example, the
United States might consider an armed attack to be imminent, even if it is not
expected immediately, when the attacker is clearly committed to the attack and
failing to act promptly would result in the loss of the opportunity to take effective
action in self-defense.79

Although the use
of nuclear weapons
is not per se
prohibited under
international law,
there are a variety
of ways in which
a nuclear strike—
particularly a first
use of nuclear
weapons—could
violate specific
international law
requirements.

For a use of force in self-defense to be legal, it also must satisfy customary
international law requirements of necessity and proportionality.80 The necessity
requirement in this context requires an assessment of whether force in a nonconsenting state is necessary to address the threat or whether other measures
short of force—law enforcement or diplomacy, for example—would suffice.81 The proportionality principle
examines the type of force employed to determine whether the damage it will cause—including to innocent
civilians—is more than what is needed to prevent or repel an armed attack. Although these assessments
are highly fact dependent, the proportionality principle is likely to be a challenge for any use of a nuclear
weapon in self-defense because of the massive human and environmental destruction that those weapons
cause and the inevitable impact on civilians.

Many Uses of Nuclear Weapons Would Violate International Humanitarian Law
IHL, also known as the law of armed conflict and the jus in bello, does not focus on the justness of a conflict
or on how the parties came to be fighting. IHL is about the means and methods used in conflict and how
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the law applies to control their use. IHL balances the two fundamental principles of humanity and military
necessity. The International Committee of the Red Cross describes the balance this way:
IHL is a compromise between two underlying principles, of humanity and of military
necessity. . . . The principle of military necessity permits only that degree and kind of
force required to achieve the legitimate purpose of a conflict, i.e. the complete or partial
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of
life and resources. It does not, however, permit the taking of measures that would otherwise
be prohibited under IHL. The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of all suffering,
injury or destruction not necessary for achieving the legitimate purpose of a conflict.82

The principle
of humanity
includes three
key requirements:
distinction,
proportionality,
and avoidance
of unnecessary
suffering. Use of a
nuclear weapon,
assuming it
can satisfy the
requirements of the
military necessity
principle, would not
be permitted if it
otherwise violates
IHL.

The principle of humanity includes three key requirements: distinction,
proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary suffering. Use of a nuclear weapon,
assuming it can satisfy the requirements of the military necessity principle, would
not be permitted if it otherwise violates IHL. As the ICJ Advisory Opinion
points out, use of nuclear weapons runs a very high risk of violating IHL because
each of the key requirements of the humanity principle raises high, perhaps
insurmountable, legal hurdles.83
Distinction Requirement. The principle of distinction protects civilians not
taking part in hostilities by requiring parties to the conflict to “distinguish
between civilian objects and military objectives and . . . direct their operations
only against military objectives.”84 Parties are not permitted to target civilian
populations.85 A related principle prohibits the use of weapons that are, by their
nature, indiscriminate—that is, those “of a nature to strike military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”86
Some argue that nuclear weapons, with their massive blasts and the even larger
radius in which radiation would be released, are by their nature indiscriminate
because it is impossible to distinguish between military objectives and civilians
in their use. According to this argument, a nuclear strike would always violate
the distinction requirement.87 The ICJ was not willing to make this broad
determination because it lacked sufficient facts, including about the possible
use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.88 The U.S. Department of Defense has
taken the position that nuclear weapons are not inherently indiscriminate.89 A
distinction analysis would consider the weapon’s strength, the manner in which
it distributes its yield, and the potential radius of radiation. Any nuclear strike
would create a high risk of a distinction violation.

Proportionality Requirement. This IHL principle prohibits launching an
attack—even against a legitimate military objective—in which incidental harm
to civilians would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.90
The proportionality principle obligates parties to refrain from such attacks and
“take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and
other persons and objects protected from being made the object of attack.”91 An attack is illegal if it would
kill or injure civilians to a degree that is disproportionate to its advantage.
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The challenges that the proportionality principle present for a contemplated nuclear strike are obvious if the
attack is planned anywhere near a civilian population. The initial blast that accompanies a nuclear attack
would kill large numbers of civilians in the area. The radiation would cause death and disease for years to
come. Thus, it is difficult to imagine a nuclear attack near civilians that would not violate the proportionality
principle, particularly if conventional weapons are available that would achieve a similar military objective.
The proportionality analysis might shift, however, if the nuclear weapon in question had a sufficiently low
yield that its overall impact would cause less harm to civilians than available
conventional weapons that were suited to the task.
Avoidance of Unnecessary Suffering. “The use of means and methods of warfare
which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is
prohibited.”92 IHL recognizes that injury and suffering will occur, but it prohibits
causing unnecessary suffering. Again, the characteristics of a nuclear strike and
the potential for long-term illness and death caused by cancer and other radiationrelated diseases make this prohibition difficult to address. This is particularly true
if conventional weapons are available that could accomplish similar objectives.93

The final decision
to launch is in the
president’s hands
alone and cannot be
overruled.

Process and Decision-Making
The internal executive branch authorities and procedures by which the United States may use nuclear weapons
have developed over decades, primarily during the Cold War. Designed to respond to a nuclear attack in
progress, the procedures have emphasized speed and decisiveness.94 This focus on rapid decision-making
is critical when minutes count but not as important when more time is available. In that circumstance, a
process that provides the president ample opportunity for input—including legal advice—and deliberation
is preferable.
Although the precise details of the nuclear launch system—known as the Nuclear Command Control
System (NCCS)95—remain highly classified,96 the general contours can be understood from the work of
scholars and accounts of those familiar with the process, including former Minuteman crew members. The
NCCS process has two phases: (1) preplanning and advice, and (2) decision and execution. The first phase
involves a continuous process of developing and reviewing options, including conducting legal review.
Before any decision to launch, the president has an opportunity to consult advisers, if he chooses to do so,
although there is no requirement or formal structure for that consultation.
The final decision to launch is in the president’s hands alone and cannot be overruled.97 Once the president
decides to launch, a more structured and automatic process begins. An Emergency Action Team, which
includes at least one senior military official, will receive the president’s decision and translate it into an order
to be communicated to combat crews. This is the final step before a launch.

Preplanning Nuclear Launch Options
The policies and procedures for a nuclear launch are designed to ensure that, if deterrence fails, the United
States “has both the capability . . . and national resolve . . . to respond effectively to any contingency.”98
Since the Truman administration, presidents have issued guidance related to the use of nuclear weapons.99
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Each administration also reviews nuclear readiness and policy objectives through a Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR).100 Within each administration, the secretary of defense, along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
combatant commanders, works to clarify contingency plans for potential employment of nuclear weapons.
Contingency planning gives the president a range of numbered-plan options spanning a diverse set of
potential attack scenarios, allowing him to choose between attacks of different scales.101 This preplanning
process is a critical opportunity to subject plans to rigorous review and debate
without the pressure of a developing crisis. Essential to the preplanning process is
a legal review. The legal review seeks to ensure that all options ultimately presented
to the president offer conventional alternatives and otherwise seeks to ensure—to
During a launch
the extent possible without knowing the exact context of a proposed strike—the
under attack,
options’ compliance with international humanitarian law.102

however, the time
available to confer
would be limited
because speed
is a top priority.
Experts estimate
that the president
would have less
than ten minutes
to deliberate in
launch-under-attack
conditions.

During a recent congressional hearing, experts distinguished a scenario in which
“the military wakes up the president” from one in which the “president wakes
the military up.”103 The first scenario (called the launch-under-attack scenario),
in which the military wakes the president, is the one for which the current
procedures were primarily designed. In this scenario, the United States is under
nuclear attack. The second scenario, as discussed in previous sections, involves
a first use of nuclear weapons, in which the United States engages in a nuclear
strike without first being the subject of a nuclear attack. The president “wakes the
military up” because there is no immediate nuclear threat. In this situation, there
is presumably more time for deliberation. Nuclear first use has generally been
considered unlikely in the years since the Cold War,104 but no law or executive
branch policy prohibits it.105

Launch Under Attack

A launch-under-attack scenario would begin with the detection of inbound
missiles or bombers. The early warning detection system is designed to “provide
‘unambiguous, reliable, accurate, timely, survivable and enduring’ warning
about attacks on the United States.”106 An alert would likely originate with North
American Aerospace Defense Command.107 The early warning staff is required to conduct a preliminary
assessment to evaluate the validity of the threat. If the threat is evaluated at “medium or high confidence,”108
the president is notified. The president then receives information on the pending attack from his top military
advisers and is presented with options for a response and an opportunity to receive advice from civilian and
military personnel.109 During a launch under attack, however, the time available to confer would be limited
because speed is a top priority.110 Experts estimate that the president would have less than ten minutes to
deliberate in launch-under-attack conditions.111
If a decision is made to launch, the president (or the person acting with his authority)112 issues a launch
order to the Pentagon and to United States Strategic Command.113 To issue the order, the president accesses
information contained in the “nuclear football,” a briefcase that always travels with the president, carried by
an active duty military officer.114 The briefcase contains an array of plans developed in advance, from which
the president selects the most appropriate option. Once the president has chosen a launch option, the order
is transmitted to the nuclear forces via an Emergency Action Team, most likely stationed at the Pentagon.115
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To be transmitted successfully, the order must survive two-person verification. It is a common misconception
that two-person verification is required to approve a launch order. The verification process is not a substantive
review of the order; it is simply a process, using prearranged codes, to ensure that the order originated with
the president himself.116 Once the president communicates the launch order and the Pentagon verifies his
identity, the Pentagon transmits the order to the components of the nuclear triad—land-based, submarine,
and bomber platforms—through a message that is approximately “the length of a tweet.”117
During execution of the launch, United States Strategic Command is responsible
for the “implementation of the nuclear launch order.”118 The verified order goes
to five land-based crews and at least one submarine crew, who then begin their
own verification process. During this time, bombers also prepare to launch with
a nuclear payload. The land-based Minuteman crews, once they have received
a launch order, use the “sealed-authentication system” (SAS) codes (prepared
by the National Security Agency) and compare the SAS codes with the order
to authenticate.119 Crews then enter the launch plan into the weapons system,
retrieve the launch keys, and enter additional codes to unlock the missiles. At the
time dictated by the original launch plan, the crews turn the keys to transmit the
plan to the missiles.120 At the turn of the key, crews transmit a “vote.” When the
missile system receives two “votes,” the launch initiates.121 This means that, even
if three crews were unwilling or unable to vote, the launch order would still be
executed upon the action of the two remaining crews. This redundancy ensures
that, even if three launch crews were destroyed in an initial attack, the United
States would maintain its ability to respond. Aboard a submarine, the missile will
launch when the captain, executive officer, and two crew members authenticate
the message. Land-based missiles launch within two minutes from the time the
initial order is issued.122 Submarine-based missiles take about fifteen minutes.123
Once missiles have launched, there is no way to recall the weapons or disarm
them in flight. 124

If a president is
considering a first
use of nuclear
weapons, the
initial process for
decision-making
could provide more
opportunity for
deliberation and
consultation than
when the nation
is under nuclear
attack.

First-Use Launch
If a president is considering a first use of nuclear weapons, the initial process for decision-making could
provide more opportunity for deliberation and consultation than when the nation is under nuclear attack.
Not all first-use launch scenarios are the same. The term first use is typically associated with a “sunny
day” scenario involving a decision by the United States to initiate a conflict, perhaps to preempt a nuclear
threat, but first use could also occur in response to a conventional attack or as an escalation of ongoing
non-nuclear hostilities. The typical process for deliberation on national security decisions is through the
National Security Council. The president convenes his key national security wadvisers, including at least
the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of
national intelligence, and the national security adviser.125 Typically, this process provides an opportunity
for legal advice through what is known as the Lawyers Group,126 which includes the senior lawyers from
the key national security departments and agencies. There is no guarantee, however, that a president will
use this process when deciding about the use of a nuclear weapon. The president alone decides how he
receives advice. The president might choose a different process with more limited participants—perhaps
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including lawyers, perhaps not—for discussion of a matter this sensitive. Thus, although the opportunity
for deliberation and legal advice exists at this stage, it depends on the president’s commitment to such a
process. If the president decides to launch a nuclear strike, with or without consultation and advice, the
process would carry on in the manner described for a launch under attack, but without the time pressures
associated with that scenario.

In a launch under
attack—or a first
use in which a
president opts for a
truncated decisionmaking process—
the opportunity
for predecisional
legal advice would
be minimal. After a
president decides,
the process of
executing his order
is largely automatic.

The United States has never adopted a “no first use” policy—in large part because
of the deterrent effect created by the availability of a first-use option. The United
States has been circumspect, however, in the way it describes the circumstances in
which nuclear force would be appropriate. Specifically, the United States has stated
that it will employ nuclear weapons only under “extreme circumstances to defend
the vital interests of the United State, its allies, and partners.”127 This was the policy
of the Obama administration and was adopted by the Trump administration in its
first NPR.128 However, there are some significant, if subtle, differences in how the
NPRs of these two administrations defined “extreme circumstances.”

Protections against Illegal Strike Orders
As discussed in the previous sections, there are some circumstances under which
a president’s order to launch a nuclear weapon would violate U.S. or international
law. An important question about the process for making such a momentous
decision is whether there are sufficient checks to allow a president or his advisers
to identify and prevent an illegal nuclear strike.

Opportunity for Legal Advice

To protect against illegal orders, there must be a realistic opportunity for lawyers
to review a strike and determine its legality. In the processes previously described,
military and civilian lawyers from the Department of Defense provide legal advice
during the preplanning of nuclear launch options. At that stage, lawyers presumably
can eliminate certain options that would be illegal under any circumstance. They
might determine, for example, that a certain weapon is inherently indiscriminate or that a proposed target
has no military objective, thus eliminating the weapon or target from consideration. Some legal analysis,
however, requires an understanding of the circumstances of a proposed strike. Determinations of military
necessity, proportionality, and unnecessary human suffering all involve a balancing that requires knowledge
of the threat and circumstances on the ground at the time of the launch decision. Constitutional questions
about the need for authorization and questions of ad bellum legality under international law are also
dependent on the facts at the time of decision and would require the involvement of lawyers outside the
Department of Defense.
As noted, it is possible—although not necessary—that a decision about a first use of nuclear weapons would
run through the traditional National Security Council process and could, therefore, receive a thorough
legal review by the Lawyers Group. In a launch under attack—or a first use in which a president opts for
a truncated decision-making process—the opportunity for predecisional legal advice would be minimal.
After a president decides, the process of executing his order is largely automatic. In the case of a first use,
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however, when there may be less time pressure, an officer on an Emergency Action Team could have an
opportunity to engage more senior officers and lawyers if there is reason for concern.

The Duty to Disobey Unlawful Orders
Members of the armed forces are bound to follow orders of their superior
officers.129 This duty of obedience, however, applies only to “lawful orders.”130 Thus,
service members are obligated to refuse orders that are “manifestly” or “patently”
illegal.131 The genesis of this obligation is international law’s rejection of the defense
of “following superior orders.”132 The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, for
example, explicitly precluded a superior-orders defense in its proceedings,133 and
subsequent international criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal
Court, have done the same.134 U.S. case law has also adopted the principle,135 and
it is clear that U.S. service members can be criminally prosecuted or held civilly
liable if their compliance with an order violates the law.136
Although the requirement to disobey unlawful orders is clear, how to identify
such an order is less so. It is not enough that an order be legally debatable or
questionable. The requirement of obedience to superior orders is critical to the
proper functioning of military command.137 To allow—even require—legal debate
about a broad range of orders would be destructive of good order and discipline.
That is why the duty to disobey applies only to “manifestly” or “patently” illegal
orders. The obligation extends only to orders that are illegal on their face; there
should be no ability to debate the legal question.138

The launch process
could make it
difficult for anyone
in the operational
chain to reach a
determination
about manifest
illegality because
it is designed to
move quickly
and relatively
automatically
after a presidential
decision.

Legal issues on matters of force are often complex and difficult. Members of
an Emergency Action Team receiving a presidential order most likely will lack
sufficient information to assess the legality of an attack. It is unlikely, for example,
that the failure to obtain congressional authorization for a use of force involving
a nuclear weapon would be considered “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. Military
officers, or even their lawyers, would have little background on those issues, and
even experts hold conflicting views on the subject. Similarly, whether a use of
force can be considered a response to an imminent armed attack for purposes of satisfying the UN Charter’s
jus ad bellum requirements for resort to force is a subject that is often contested among countries and within
the U.S. legal community. The answer would be no more clear to a service member reacting to a launch
order.
There are circumstances, however, in which an order to use a nuclear weapon—particularly if the order
involves a first use of such a weapon—would be “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. Context is important, but,
for example, an order for a nuclear strike targeting a civilian population center that would not provide a
direct military advantage would be “manifestly” or “patently” illegal. Similarly, an order to strike a military
target in an urban or other densely populated setting—particularly when a conventional weapon that is less
devastating to civilians would suffice—would be “manifestly” disproportionate and would satisfy even the
rigorous standard for the duty to disobey.
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Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the launch process could make it difficult for anyone in the
operational chain to reach a determination about manifest illegality because it is designed to move quickly
and relatively automatically after a presidential decision. Furthermore, those in the process might assume
that legal concerns had been resolved in advance of a launch, during the development of numbered plans.
Even if a military officer is convinced of a launch’s illegality and decides to disobey the president, it is
not clear whether or how that would halt a launch. Recently, current and former commanders of United
States Strategic Command have stated that they would oppose an illegal nuclear strike order and notify the
president of their concerns.139 Neither commander suggested that his decision would necessarily stop the
launch.140 Some experts argue that there would be inadequate time to halt an illegal order.141

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The constant “nuclear anxiety”142 of the Cold War, coupled with the sudden assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, prompted the 89th Congress to address gaps left by the Presidential Succession Act of
1947.143 As then former vice president Richard Nixon explained, “[w]ith the advent of the terrible and
instant destructive power of atomic weapons, the nation cannot afford to have any period of time when
there is doubt or legal quibbling as to where the ultimate power to use those weapons resides.”144 The result
of congressional action, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1967,145 provides procedures for vice
presidential succession and for scenarios in which the president is disabled,146 thereby ensuring “continuity
of executive authority.”147
Section 4148 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is the provision most often raised during discussions about
nuclear launch authority as it relates to presidential disability.149 Section 4150 provides that, if the president
is no longer able to perform the duties of the office,151 the vice president, the cabinet, and Congress have
the ability to transfer power from the president to the vice president.152 There is no clear standard for
defining “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”153 Such a determination would be left
to the vice president and members of the cabinet.154 Proceedings under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
would begin when the vice president and a majority of the principal cabinet members155 notify Congress
of the president’s inability to perform his duties.156 Upon notification of Congress, executive authority is
transferred immediately to the vice president.157 In response, the president may convey to Congress that “no
inability exists,” at which time he “resumes the powers and duties of his office.”158 The vice president, again
with a majority of the cabinet, may then notify Congress that the incapacity remains, in which case the
vice president would retain the powers of the presidency until a vote by both houses. A decision to transfer
power to the vice president requires a two-thirds vote of both the House and the Senate.159
As previously discussed, particularly in a launch-under-attack scenario, the nuclear launch decision process
can move extremely quickly. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s removal procedures are cumbersome and
would not provide an expedient solution to presidential disability in a launch-under-attack scenario.
However, if an infirm president were considering a preemptive nuclear strike that his advisers considered
reckless, or worse, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment could provide a route to a transfer of power.
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Conclusion

A

s the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the president has significant authority and flexibility
on decisions about use of nuclear weapons. There are some legal limits to his authority, however.
If the president were to consider a first use of nuclear weapons, precedent within the executive branch
would require in some cases that he first seek congressional authorization. In addition, requirements of
international humanitarian law raise significant—in some cases insurmountable—legal hurdles for many
potential uses of nuclear weapons. What is not clear is whether the current procedures for reaching decisions
on a nuclear launch are adequate to ensure that these legal requirements will be considered or that the
president’s advisers will have the opportunity to protect against an illegal strike order.
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